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EXISTENTIALISM: A REACTION TO
THE AGE OF ORGANIZATION
JAMES W. DAVIS, JR.
University of Michigan
N Philosophy for a Time of Crisis Adrienne Koch has called the twentieth
I century a crisis century and has commented on the extent of the crisis. &dquo;ItJL is a crisis of the human person, of the relation of the person to nature, to his
work, to other people, to social organization.&dquo;’ In another way Hannah Arendt
has said the same thing. &dquo;It is quite conceivable that the modern age - which
began with such an unprecedented and promising outburst of human activity -
may end in the deadliest, most sterile passivity history has ever known.&dquo;2 To
understand why these writers are so pessimistic we have only to look at the social
environment people today inhabit. Varied descriptions of this environment could
be given, but any description would have to mention the dominance of large-scale
organizations. Sheldon Wolin has indeed suggested that today we are in &dquo;The
Age of Organization.&dquo;3 Government is big, business is big, labor is big. Even the
student in the university confronts a large impersonal organization.
The age of organization is not altogether a twentieth-century development.
The nineteenth had been also a century greatly taken with the idea of organiza-
tion. Saint-Simon, Wolin notes, &dquo;accurately reported on the guiding belief of the
organizational age: The superiority of men over other animals ’results directly
from a superiority of organization.’ &dquo;4 But nineteenth-century interest in organi-
zation only foreshadowed increased interest in the twentieth century.
In the twentieth century the fascination with organization reached new heights. Organization
was conceived to be the means whereby twentieth-century man transcended his individual limita-
tions. Wealth, power, plenty, and knowledge were all to be had through a kind of social alchemy.
But more important, these achievements apparently did not require, as religious transcendence
did, a &dquo;new man.&dquo; Man could accomplish great things without himself becoming great, without
developing uncommon skills or moral excellence. The secret of organization was that it com-
pensated for human shortcomings....’
Wolin is by no means alone in commenting on the importance of organization
today. Peter Blau has called bureaucracy &dquo;the institution that epitomizes the
modern era.&dquo;s Because of the importance of bureaucracy many scholars have
extensively written about it. Reinhard Bendix, Philip Selznik, and Herbert Simon
are among the most well known. Blau’s latest book, Formal Organizations, con-
tains a selected bibliography of something over eight hundred items.7 7
NOTE: This quite brief paper explores nothing in depth. Rather it is a brief survey of a
problem that I regard as one of the most pressing (and interesting) of the twentieth century.
1 Adrienne Koch, Philosophy for a Time of Crisis (New York: Dutton, 1960), p. 22.
2 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Garden City: Doubleday, 1959), p. 295.
3 Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), p. 352.
4 Ibid., p. 364.
5 Ibid., pp. 379-80.
6 Peter M. Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 20.
7 Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962).
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The amount of study being devoted to large-scale organizations is indicative
of at least two things. First, it indicates most obviously the increasing interest of
social scientists in the study of large-scale organizations. And this increased in-
terest is indicative of &dquo;the unprecedented growth in modern society of large-
scale formal organizations....&dquo;8 Study is also being devoted to organizations be,
cause scholars are increasingly concerned with their social, moral, and political
implications. Exploration of some implications is indeed the purpose of this
paper.
Thus far several similar terms have occurred: large-scale organization, for-
mal organization, bureaucracy. The term &dquo;complex organization&dquo; could also have
been used. The most general of these terms is formal organization, the distinc-
tive characteristic of which is that it has been &dquo;formally established for the ex-
plicit purpose of achieving certain goals.&dquo;9 The other terms may apply to formal
organizations, organizations varying in size and complexity and degree of bureauc-
ratization. Despite this variance the basic characteristics of formal organizations
can be set out: specialization, hierarchy, a system of rules, and impersonality.
These characteristics will vary, but in some degree they are present in every for-
mal organization. If we are to understand social life today we must be aware of
these characteristics.
If we begin to wonder why the twentieth century is an age of organization
we can find many answers. Two writers on administration suggest that the large
organization is &dquo;a consequence of such factors as demand for higher living stand-
ards, technological changes, and the laws of economics.&dquo;10 But this is only one ex-
planation. A brief trip into the literature reveals several others. Erich Kahler
writes, &dquo;The roots of collectivism are to be found in rationalism and technology
and not in any specific social or economic doctrine.&dquo;’:’ The philosopher of history,
Roderick Seidenberg, has commented on the question at length:
The cumulative drift toward organization in every aspect of modern life is not due to some
conscious desire to convert the complexity of society into the likeness of a smooth-functioning
ma.chine; it follows, on the contrary, from an inherent necessity, a principle of organization itself,
which demands, imperatively and implicitly, an ever increasing extension of organization in the
name of its higher functioning and perfected developments. For the principle of organization,
as we have seen, carries with it a kind of extroverted necessity to expand; organization breeds or~
ganization as a crystal breeds crystal1.12
Wolin writes:
Among nineteenth-century writers the idea of organization was partly associated with economic
or technological considerations, but in its mature form, such as we know it today, it has meant
far more. Organization also signifies a method of social control, a means of imparting order,
structure, and regularity to society. 13
8 Blau, op. cit., p. 5.
9 Blau and Scott, op. cit., p. 5.
10 John M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood, Administrative Organization (Englewood Cliffs: Pren-
tice Hall, 1960), p. 7.
11 Erich Kahler, The Tower and the Abyss (New York: Braziller, 1957), p. 17. Emphasis is
Kahler’s.
12 Roderick Seidenberg, Posthistoric Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 134.
13 Wolin, op. cit., p. 364.
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Finally we may turn again to Blau who says, &dquo;In the large and complex societies
of today, the implementation of new social policies requires bureaucratic ma-
chinery.&dquo;14 He suggests that &dquo;the deliberate introduction of a social innovation on
a large scale, whether it involves the production of a new weapon or the enforce-
ment of a new law, depends on bureaucratic methods of administration.&dquo;15
Each one of these reasons will not be examined. They seem, however, to
fall into two groups that might be labeled direct and indirect. Blau in partic-
ular and perhaps Pfiffner and Sherwood are getting at the direct causes, the im-
mediate causes. The other writers, perhaps the more philosophically minded,
are concerned more with intellectual climatic reasons. The point is that there
may be truth in all these explanations, that they are not mutually exclusive.
Certainly the complexity of the question suggests that there is no one explana-
tion. In any event the precise reasons for the growth of the age of organization
may not be terribly important. It may, indeed, be enough to recognize that vast
organizations have developed.
So important is the organization today that Victor Thompson has called
modern men &dquo;a product of modern organization&dquo; 16 and William H. Whyte has
called organization men &dquo;the dominant members of our society.&dquo; 17 What is
an organization man? The definition is hazy, as Whyte admits. In his words,
briefly, &dquo;The ones I am talking about belong to it [the organization] as well.
They are the ones of our middle class who have left home, spiritually as well
as physically, to take the vows of organization life, and it is they who are the
mind and soul of our great self-perpetuating institutions.&dquo; 18 Whyte argues in
The Organization Man that today a social ethic has replaced the Protestant
Ethic. He makes quite clear what he means by social ethic.
By social ethic I mean that contemporary body of thought which makes morally legitimate the
pressures of society against the individual. Its major propositions are three: a belief in the group
as the source of creativity; a belief in &dquo;belongingness&dquo; as the ultimate need of the individual;
a belief in the application of science to achieve the belongingness.’9
Kahler, earlier than Whyte, also noted the development of a social ethic,
though he did not call it that. He too noted that the group, and not the indi-
vidual, is the decisive factor. We live, he observed, &dquo;in a world in which the
collective and no longer the individual is the standard unit.&dquo; Zo
It should be emphasized that organizations are not only the essence of the
present, they may be also the key to the future.
As society is more and more dominated by largeness, bureaucracy’s share of total life cannot
but grow with it. The future, if there is to be one, points to ever greater hugeness. Beyond that,
Boulding is correct in saying, &dquo;The electric tabulator, the punched card, operations research
14 Blau, 1956, op. cit., p. 91.
15 Ibid., p. 92.
16 Victor A. Thompson, Modern Organization (New York: Knopf, 1961), p. 4.
17 William H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man (Garden City: Doubleday, 1961), p. 3. Em-
phasis is Whyte’s.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., p. 7.
20 Kahler, op. cit., p. 226.
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and decision theory all point to still further revolution in the making ...&dquo; toward still more
bureaucracy.21
If it is true that the organizational revolution has not yet reached its zenith then
it is all the more important that we attend to it, and to its effects and implications.
II
In large organizations most people spend most of their time as small cogs
in the bureaucratic machinery. And as society itself becomes bureaucratized a
man’s whole life resembles life in an organization. The organization increasingly
becomes the only whole, and each man becomes only a part. The perceived dis-
appearance of man as a whole has had important consequences. Some writers
have gone so far as to sugggest that man is being dehumanized. William Barrett
suggests that collectivized man is &dquo;only an abstract fragment of man.&dquo; 22 Kahler
suggests that the organization overemphasizes the functional collective part of a
person.23 And the industrial sociologist Chris Argyris has written: &dquo;Most human
problems in organizations arise because relatively healthy people in our culture
are asked to participate in work situations which coerce them to be dependent,
subordinate, submissive and to use few of their more than superficial abilities.&dquo; 24
At least in part because of the fragmentation of man induced by large organ,
izations, one of the most common words used in talk about the human situa-
tion today is &dquo;alienation.&dquo; With the growth of large-scale organizations and, to
be sure, with the increasing pace of urbanization and industrialization, to say
nothing of secularization, there has been a loss of community and man has
become alienated. 25 Modern man’s sense of alienation, which would have been
great enough because of war, economic crisis, political and religious upheaval,
has been intensified by living in the midst of a bureaucratized impersonal society.
And if it is not enough to be a stranger to God and to his fellows, man is often
also a stranger to himself. &dquo;In a society that requires of man only that he perform
competently his own particular social function, man becomes identified with this
function, and the rest of his being is allowed to subsist as best it can - usually
to be dropped below the surface of consciousness and forgotten.&dquo; 26
To these events there has been rebellion, both conscious and unconscious.
Thompson has commented specifically on what might be called the unconscious
rebellion.
There are many people in our society who have not been able to adapt to bureaucracy and
who, therefore, find it a constant and complete frustration. Theirs is a kind of social disease
which we might call bureausis. &dquo;Bureautics&dquo; find the rationalism, orderliness, impartiality, and
21 Joseph Bensman and Bernard Rosenberg, "The Meaning of Work in Bureaucratic Society," in
Maurice Stein and others, Identity and Anxiety (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960), p. 197.
22 William Barrett, Irrational Man (Garden City: Doubleday, 1958), p. 26.
23 Kahler, op. cit., p. 186.
24 Chris Argyris, "The Individual and Organization: An Empirical Test," Administrative Science
Quarterly, 4 (1959), 148.
25 Koch, op. cit., p. 19. 
26 Barrett, op. cit., p. 31. 
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impersonality of the bureaucratic organization intolerable. They crave an immediate and tender
response to their unique problems, whatever they may be. Bureautics are immature. They have
never been weaned from habits of childhood indulgence.&dquo;
Not everyone, however, views failure to adjust to bureaucracy as evidence
of illness. Indeed, even Thompson is not entirely consistent, for elsewhere in
his book he remarks, &dquo;This denial of adulthood is surely one of the more painful
aspects of modern organization.&dquo; 28 Thompson, at least, apparently holds the
somewhat curious view that if an adult persists in wanting to be an adult he
is being immature. Despite this seeming inconsistency Thompson seems to be
on the side of adjustment to organization. But there have been voices raised on
the other side. The late Robert Lindner, a psychoanalyst, in a popular volume
entitled, Must You Conform? answered, &dquo;No.&dquo; Indeed, he suggested that in
order to live man must rebel .29 The better known work by Whyte amounts to
a handbook for anyone who is interested in resisting the organization. The reac-
tion to the age of organization has not been all on the popular, best-seller level,
however. There has also been much reaction in more thoughtful, less well-
known circles. This reaction is perhaps epitomized by a current philosophic
orientation - existentialism.
III
What is existentialism? To this question there is no easy answer, there is
no short definition. There is not in existentialism a systematic body of thought,
nor do existentialists constitute a school. Some thinkers often thought of as existen-
tialists decline the title. Existentialism includes Christians, atheists, and men
who can only be placed in between. Above, I suggested that existentialism was
more than anything else an orientation, a style of thought, and this perhaps is
all that can be said. F. H. Heinemann suggests that existentialism &dquo;points to a
certain state of mind, to a specific approach or attitude, to a spiritual movement
which is of significance in present circumstances and to a specific mode of
thought, in any case to something which is alive.&dquo; 3° Professor Barrett, in trying
to suggest the dimensions of existentialism, says that it
embodies the self questioning of the time, seeking to reorient itself to its own historical destiny.
Indeed, the whole problematic of Existentialism unfolds from this historical situation. Aliena-
tion and estrangement; a sense of the basic fragility and contingency of human life; the impo-
tence of reason confronted with the depth of existence; the threat of Nothingness, and the
solitary and unsheltered condition of the individual before the threat.3’ 
z
In the first section of this paper I suggested that the age of organization
had its roots in the nineteenth century. So, too, does existentialism. The cen-
tury that had Saint-Simon had also Kierkegaard, the champion of the indivi-
dual. Nietzche and Ibsen were worried also by the encroachment of the organ-
ization and were concerned for the individual, the human.
27 Thompson, op. cit., p. 24. Emphasis his.
28 Ibid., p. 96.
29 Robert Lindner, Must You Conform? (New York: Rinehart, 1956), p. 176.
30 F. H. Heinemann, Existentialism and the Modern Predicament (New York: Harper, 1958),
p. 165.
31 Barrett, op. cit., p. 31.
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Professor Barrett has suggested that existentialism is &dquo;a product of bourgeois
society in a state of dissolution.&dquo; 32 (Does it have the same roots as Marxism?)
Perhaps, it is too much to say that bourgeois society is in a state of dissolution.
What is more likely is that dissolution is what the existentialists perceive. For
them it is. Existentialism has grown not only from perception and interpreta-
tion, however, it has grown also from fact. At least it has grown from fact if
alienation, the feeling of estrangement of modern man is taken as fact for the
existentialists’ point of departure is alienation, &dquo;their aim the liberation from
estrangement.&dquo; 33
In fact, the existentialists are philosophers of resistance. They attempt to resist the collectivizing
trend, bound up with machine production, which seems to lead in any society ... to depersonali,
zation of man. This resistance takes various forms. Kierkegaard criticizes the modern tendency
towards equality and the levelling brought about by public opinion and the rise of the masses.
Jaspers protests against the absorption of man by the machinery of the modern welfare state,
Marcel against the increased socialization of life, against the extension of the power of the State,
and against the substitution of the registration card for the person.3’
The existentialist sees danger to the life of the individual in the industrial
machine, the government bureaucracy, the totalitarian state. But also dangerous
are science, morals, laws, Christianity, and humanism. &dquo;Faith in science, or
reason, or duty, or homo f aber, or Christ if it stands between the individual and
his total responsibility hides him from himself.&dquo; 35 The existentialist accepts in
all their fullness the difficulties and dangers of the human situation. He is afraid
that anything that will ease our circumstances will also dehumanize us. The
existentialist sees that life as a part is easy, but that life as a whole is human
and hard.
Above all the existentialist fears rationalism.
... the essence of the existential protest is that rationalism can pervade a whole civilization, to
the point where the individuals in that civilization do less and less thinking, and perhaps wind
up doing none at all. It can bring this about by dictating the fundamental ways and routines
by which life itself moves. Technology is one material incarnation of rationalism, since it de-
rives from science; bureaucracy is another since it aims at the rational control and ordering of
social life; and the two - technology and bureaucracy - have come more and more to rule
our lives.
But it is not so much rationalism as abstractness that is the existentialists’ target; and the
abstractness of life in this technological and bureaucratic age is now indeed something to reckon
with.36
IV
Enough has by now been said about the existential revolt to the age of
organization to let us speculate about its value, its point. To repeat the essentials
of what has gone before, existentialism is an attempt to liberate man from the
dominance of external forces. It is a resistance movement. In an age of organ-
ization it worries about the future of the individual. Because it is almost totally
concerned with the individual a viable political or social theory cannot be based
32 Ibid., p. 30.
33 Heinemann, op. cit., p. 9.
34 Ibid., p. 167.
35 H. J. Blackham, Six Existentialist Thinkers (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 163.
36 Barrett, op. cit., p. 239.
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on existentialism. Organization and society are important. We cannot escape
technology and bureaucracy. But we must beware of their dominance. Exis-
tentialism reminds us of the dangers of organization, technology, rationality, ab-
straction. These by-words of the modern age are its targets and they are proper
targets.
The organization is dangerous. To function it requires submissiveness and
conformity, yet these attitudes, if carried over into social and political life, could
have unforeseen (and unpleasant) consequences. Submissiveness and conform-
ity are required in a bureaucratic organization for &dquo;efficiency.&dquo; A danger is that
the desire for efficiency (achieved by conformity) will carry over to life outside
the formal organization. Peter Blau is aware of this danger and says:
... if an association is established for the purpose of deciding upon common goals and courses
of action to implement them, which is the function of democratic government ... , the free ex-
pression of opinion must be safeguarded against other considerations, including those of efficiency.
Since bureaucratization prevents the attainment of this objective it must be avoided at all costs.37
The danger of bureaucracy is the more great since &dquo;the doctrines of democracy
and liberalism which underlie our state have made almost no impact upon our
bureaucratic organizations.&dquo; 3$
The lack of interest in this liberal tradition seems to be especially pronounced among the more
scientifically oriented students of organization. For example, Thibaut and Kelley maintain that
it is simpler and more effective to have the same person maintain surveillance and apply sanc-
tions, thereby rejecting the entire historical experience of Western legal institutions
In the growth of bureaucratic organizations some writers see the doom of
democratic institutions.4° It would be foolish to deny the danger. The first sen-
tence of this paper noted that the twentieth had been called the crisis century.
So long, however, as there are men who insist that man is a whole, and that
organization must be only a servant, not a master, then it may not be too dan-
gerous to live in the age of organization.
37 Blau, 1956, op. cit., p. 23.
38 Thompson, op. cit., p. 65.
39 Ibid., pp. 65-66, fn. 5.
40 Blau, 1956, op. cit., p. 22.
